On Fortune and Effort by A Student of History CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UND ER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in fre edom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to r uin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an olig archy which will keep it friendly to you.

Because such a government, being creat ed by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest , and does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city acc ustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens tha n in any other way. There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spa rtans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost them.

The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantl ed them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it t hey were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there i s no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them.

And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and it s ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will e ver cause it to forget.

And whatever you may do or provide against, they never f orget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries ar e accustomed to live under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old pri nce, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know ho w to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily.

But in repub lics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, whic h will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there. CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS A ND ABILITY Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalitie s as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; beca use men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imita tion their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attai n to the power of those they imitate.

A wise man ought always to follow the path s beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if hi s ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it.

Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far dis tant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take ai m much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wi sh to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly a s there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, as the f act of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either ability or fo rtune, it is clear that one or other of these things will mitigate in some degre e many difficulties.

Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is establi shed the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no o ther state, is compelled to reside there in person. But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples.

And although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the wi ll of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him wo rthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular deeds an d conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of Moses , although he had so great a preceptor.

And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which bro ught them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefo re, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppr essed by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so a s to be delivered out of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remai n in Alba, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland.

It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, ther efore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recogniz e the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with dif ficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce t o establish their government and its security.

And it ought to be remembered tha t there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a ne w order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.

This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readi ly believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummat e their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when they c an rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered.

Hence it i s that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroy ed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whi lst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longe r, it may be possible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, a nd Romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with hi s new order of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and h e had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbeliev ers to believe.

Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who envied them thei r success are exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will conti nue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man ro se from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anyt hing to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince.

He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man abolished the old soldie ry, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his o wn soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: th us, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keepin g.

[1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.